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I. INTRODUCTION: THREE THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS ABOUT LAW AND
LEGAL EDUCATION
A. What Is "Law" as a Field?
Any consideration of what legal education should consist of
must begin with the question of what "law," as a field of study, is.
Whether a study of "the law" is science, philosophy, political science,
or a field unto itself, or is more like a social science study of the norms
and behaviors that human beings create and enforce for their self-
governance, what the field is should have something to do with how it
is studied.
So, one can ask, what is the object of study when one studies
"the law"? Court decisions and interpretations (doctrine) and statutes
and regulations (the rules) are "the substantive law" one could study.
Or, one could study law's processes ("adjectival" law): procedure;
constitutionalism (as in separation of powers, limited and specified
authority, and federalism); institutional competence; law-making
(legislation, administrative regulation, lobbying, advocacy); or
enforcement and compliance (the "law in action"). Then there are the
hermeneutics, or interpretative study, of law's meaning(s). To get at
more root matters, one could study why there is law and what its
purpose is (or should be)-the jurisprudence or theory of law.
Even after defining the field of law one would still have to ask
whether this field has a particular method of study that qualifies it to
be called a discipline. Is law the study of the particular method of legal
reasoning,1  which relies on precedents and rules of cases,
differentiation of facts, policy analysis, and use of analogical reason to
1. See generally EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949) (positing
the theory that law is the method of legal reasoning mentioned above).
[Vol. 60:2:555
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arrive at statements of what the law is? Does one treat law as the
study of texts (as a humanistic discipline)? As the study of predictions
or principles of social allocation (law and economics)? Or as
predictions or descriptions of the actions of social institutions, legal
actors, or the acted upon (socio-legal studies)?
Or is law merely a practice or activity, without any particular
disciplinary or field boundaries? Law would then be simply all that
lawyers do.2 Or, in Holmesian terms, the law would be only what the
law does to those who violate it-the sanctions imposed on "bad men."3
Or, as this paper will suggest, perhaps there is no one way to
see and study this elephant. 4 Rather, the study of law is itself
necessarily a multi-disciplinary enterprise, borrowing from or using
the insights, methods, and canons of other fields to tell us about how
we govern ourselves. As one sociologist of law has urged, when
admonishing us to consider law and legal institutions from outside the
categories that lawyers make: "[Liaw is to be understood in terms of
social theory. Legal theory is to be seen as a particular branch or
application of social theory."5
Law is created by human beings to govern themselves, to
create order and social control, and, at its best, to provide justice. So,
in my view, to study how law is made, interpreted, complied with,
enforced, or resisted, is to study how law is experienced-by those who
make and interpret law, by those who use it and advise others how to
use it, and by those who are acted upon by law. To study experience
we need not only logic (apologies to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.6) but
also social science, including statistics (numbers), narrative (words),
and empathic understanding, as well as all of their constituent
disciplines. This means that law is at least partially a "derivative"
2. Despite my own background in clinical education and the practice of law, this notion of
law as only practice or activity was suggested to me by a philosopher of law. Karl Llewellyn
classically described the law as "what... officials do about disputes." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 3 (1951). The study of professional practice has
itself become a "field." See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1992); DONALD
SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983); Herbert
Kritzer, Toward a Theorization of Craft, (Symposium on Judgecraft, forthcoming).
3. ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 138-39 (2000).
4. VARIOUS SECTARIANS FROM THE UDANA: INSPIRED UTTERANCES OF THE BUDDHA (John
D. Ireland trans.) (1997), available at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/
ud.6.04.irel.html (Buddhist folktale about the description of an elephant by nine blind men, all
"seeing" different parts of the animal in their descriptions of what makes an elephant.).
5. ROGER COTTERREL, LAW'S COMMUNITY 77 (1995).
6. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Little, Brown & Co. 1990) (1881)
('The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); William W. Fisher III, Interpreting
Holmes, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1997) (on the 100th anniversary of The Path of the Law).
2007] 57
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
field, requiring study of other disciplines that provide methods and
ideas with which to understand and evaluate it. 7
B. What "Ideas" Has Law Generated as a Field?8
If law claims to be a field, what ideas has it uniquely or
originally contributed to human knowledge? Do "due process," or
"rules of evidence and proof," or "the rule against perpetuities," or
"American Constitutionalism" (separation of powers, judicial review,
federalism), or even basic notions of fairness, constitute original
insights of law as a discipline?9 Or are all of these ideas derivative of
political philosophy? Certainly, transaction costs (the Coase theorem),
efficiency, and the deterrence effects of sanctions are all derived from
economics or sociology. Has law, as a field, contributed anything new
to what we know? Can you think of any new ideas that are peculiarly
legal?10 Does a field have to generate ideas to be a discipline?1' Must it
have a distinctive method of inquiry? Of validation?
If law is rather a practice or activity-a way of organizing
human behavior in furtherance of some important human goals, like
justice, peace, or order-has it created particular forms or ideas of
practice, for example, the trial, the contract, the interrogatory? As an
arena of professional practice, one can ask is law more or less a field
than medicine or engineering or architecture (which are practices
based on the derivative teachings of science) or ministry (which is a
practice based on the derivative teachings of theology)? Is law as a
practice a "creative art," like other forms of performance? Is making a
good argument the equivalent of composing a symphony, or more like
successfully completing a difficult pas de deux?
7. For another discussion of this question of whether law is a field or discipline and how it
should be studied, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP (1999).
8. I am not the first to ask these sorts of questions. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, LAW IN
CONTEXT: ENLARGING A DISCIPLINE 339-53 (1997).
9. For my own examples of "creative" insights and new ideas in law see Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal
Education, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 124-35 (2001).
10. In this symposium Ernest Weinrib argues that such concepts as liability (and
"proximate causation") and contract are such particularly "legal" and original concepts and that
legal thinking is a particular and distinct form of method. See Ernest Weinrib, Can Law Survive
Legal Education?, 60 VAND. L. REV. 401, 437-38 (2007).
11. In cultural terms, we can think of ideas, like genes, as "memes" or units of transferable
cultural notions and practices. See, e.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND INVENTION 7 (1996); HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE
REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 82 (1999).
[Vol. 60:2:555
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C. What is the Purpose of Legal Education in Relation to the Above?
If law does generate its own ideas and observations about
human behavior and practices, then at least one purpose of legal
education is the production of knowledge about law and its practice
through study and research into "new" ideas about law. How should
legal education be structured to bring out the best (most accurate or
robust) ideas about law? How does one do "research" in the new ideas
of law? How does one combine the transmittal of known ideas and
practices with the development of new ones?
If law is not a discipline unto itself, but merely transmits the
relevant knowledge required for its use or practice, how should that
knowledge regarding law itself be transmitted: by Langdellian
induction of principles through reading cases; 12 by parsing of statutes
according to the canons of statutory construction; by simulated
experiences of lawyers doing client advising, advocacy, negotiating, or
lobbying? What forms of training or teaching are appropriate for
students to learn how to "think," "act," or "do" like a lawyer, or as one
sage commentator has noted, how to think about doing?
1 3
Is there such a thing, in the modern world, as acting or
thinking like "a" lawyer? Aren't there too many different forms of legal
practice to construct a generalizable or uniform idea of "a" lawyer for
educational purposes?
How is law used in modern society? Is legal education only for
practicing lawyers, judges, or theorizing legal academics, or should
legal education be thought of more broadly (as in many non-American
settings) as basic civic knowledge or education about the rules and
institutions that govern one's life? And what should would-be lawyers
learn about the impact of law and legal institutions on society? What
difference do law, legal institutions, and lawyers make?
However you have answered these questions or thought about
these issues, I want to suggest that the modern and rigorous study of
12. Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983); see also LEVI, supra
note 1, at 27; LLEWELLYN, supra note 2; Bruce Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the
Century of Historiography, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277 (2004) (reviewing the distortions and
inaccuracies in Langdell's legacy as described in succeeding generations of scholars and
commentators); Bruce Kimball, Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions Which They
Are Not To Take as Law: The Inception of the Case Method Teaching in the Early Classrooms of
the Early C.C. Langdell 1870-1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57 (1999).
13. Or as Professor Twining so eloquently puts it, "know-what (knowledge), know-why
(theory) and know-how (skills)." See TWINING, supra note 8, at 18. As a modern law and society
scholar, legal realist and legal clinician, I would add "know-who" (the study of power and
relationships in law. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:




law and legal institutions must take seriously the ideas and empirical
findings of many other disciplines outside of law, because law is not an
entirely autonomous discipline. Legal doctrine is derived from policy
considerations (which are in turn based on empirical claims about the
condition of the world and normative claims about how it might be
changed), as well as the facts of disputed individual cases. Law, in
turn, affects and influences how people behave toward each other and
the policies that are in turn made by both public and private parties
as they deploy the law in their interactions. What law is made and
how it is experienced are determined by factors exogenous to "simple"
doctrinal legal logic.
In my view, good legal education must include the "before," 14
"during," and "after" causes and effects of law and legal institutions on
those whom the law seeks to influence and control. In this paper I
hope to suggest some ways in which law as a multidisciplinary field
might optimally be studied, in context, and with appropriate attention
to what it does in the world. Part II summarizes the history of others'
attempts to make legal education more multidisciplinary, reviewing
the many attempts to reform legal education since its modern creation
(and remaining current formulation) in the 1870s-what I here call
"Big Bang ' moments in legal education. Part III outlines my own
vision of what truly interdisciplinary legal education would look like-
before, during, and after "the law." In this Part, I will make some
suggestions for taking seriously the redesign of a three-year
curriculum that better places the law in context and gives law
students more diverse tools for explanation, understanding, and
practice of law. Part IV will illustrate how these suggestions might be
implemented with descriptions of some current successful efforts to
make rigorous the study of law embedded in society, or as Karl
Llewellyn called it, "the community." 15
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOME "BIG BANG" MOMENTS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION
A. Langdell's Canons of Legal Education
The more or less conventional history of American legal
education has been told many times, chronicling the movement from
14. The leading interdisciplinary text for undergraduates in law and society programs is
JOHN J. BONSIGNORE ET AL., BEFORE THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (7th ed.
2002).
15. LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, at 11.
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apprenticeships to private proprietary law schools to universities, full
time study, and increasingly academic (and some would argue more
esoteric16) legal scholarship and pedagogy. 17  The Langdellian
"revolution" of 1870, which we still inhabit, was noted for doing
several important things for legal education:
* Treating law (as a field) as a science of principles
learned by induction through reading cases and
systematically arranging their holdings into a coherent
body of limited, general principles;
* Developing a new teaching method from the distortion
of Socratic philosophical dialogue, by applying some (but
not all) of the methods of teacher-directed learning
through questioning; 8
* Using this so-called "Socratic method" to encourage a
certain form of rigorous thinking, designed to sort the
relevant from the irrelevant (in facts), to whittle out the
necessary and sufficient holding (which became the rule
of the case) from the superfluous and unnecessary dicta,
and to state with efficiency and parsimony the ratio
decidendi of the case;' 9
* Facilitating the teaching of many students in one
classroom (with remarkably uniform architecture for
over a century), which ultimately turned out to be
profitable for law schools and universities, 20 if not ideal
for learning;
* Developing the modern "casebook" (the collection of key
cases from the common law in the classic, mostly
private law, subjects) from which the "principles of law"
were to be derived by students with little textual
16. See Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); see also Sam Estreicher, In Defense of Theory: Notes on
the Production of Legal Scholarship, 10 GREEN BAG 49 (2006).
17. See generally LEGAL EDUCATION (Martin Lyon Levine, ed. 1993); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983); THE HISTORY OF
LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES, VOLS. I AND II
(Steve Sheppard, ed. 1999).
18. Socrates did not question hundreds of students at once, so even if there was some
humiliation in not seeing the logical endpoint of a badly made argument, the student (or
students) could learn and modify their thinking without complete shame in front of many peers.
19. For one of the classic statements of how to read and, as we would say now, "process" a
case, see LLEWELLYN, supra note 2, at 39-57.
20. This teaching method uses very high student-teacher ratios, even with increasingly
high tuition payments from students. PETER DE L. SWORDS & FRANK K. WALWER, THE COSTS AND




explanation 2 (and the virtual elimination of didactic
lectures 22);
* Introducing a graded and sequenced curriculum with
annual examinations; 23
* Developing the modern law library as more than a place
for textbooks, encouraging scholarly research in the law;
* Creating the modern professoriate, a breed of
professionally separate academic lawyers who were not
expected to practice or know much about the real world
of practice, but were (and are) chosen for their academic
excellence as students and their presumed intellectual
acuity, if not for their teaching ability or legal
professional achievements, and who developed into
"outsider" critics of the law as written and practiced; 24
* Claiming that the "experiential" or "active"25
educational method of Socratic classes, where law
students learned to "think" like a lawyer, by "doing"
legal reasoning in the classroom in front of professor
and fellow students alike, was unique compared to other
disciplines, where graduate students passively attended
didactic lectures;
21. In one of the first "big bangs" to challenge Langdellian formalism, the era of Legal
Realism issued in a broader conception of the textbook which became "Cases and Materials on..
• ." The Legal Realists added some other materials to the steady diet of cases, including some
government reports, a few empirical studies, some narrative stories, a few statutes and
administrative regulations. It is striking how long this basic format has lasted. Modern
"textbooks" still follow mostly this format of cases, with some Notes and Questions, and
hypotheticals, and some few other materials for student analysis. Texts that depart too much
from this format are often seen as not "real" casebooks by students. Many efforts to radically
transform teaching materials have been developed, but none have really challenged the casebook
market. See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & BEATRICE MOULTON, LAWYERING PROCESS: CLINICAL
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978); Girardeau Spann, with Weistart and Powell, DVD: The
Contracts Experience (Duke University School of Law 2002).
22. Nineteenth and twentieth century Socratic teachers still wrote didactic treatises which
were intended to state the law, its principles, reasons and policies for judges, practicing lawyers
and other legal scholars, if not students. Some would argue that the didactic lecture has returned
to legal education as modern law professors increasingly shy away from using conventional
Socratic questioning techniques that are now thought to be too brutal. See generally JOHN JAY
OSBORNE, JR., THE PAPER CHASE (1974) (classic popular culture real and fictional depictions of
legal education in the 1960s and 1970s credited for diminishing the use of traditional Socratic
questioning); SCOTT TUROW, ONE L (1977).
23. See Kimball, supra note 12, at 277.
24. Consider the remaining and frequently used Socratic question: "How and why was this
case wrongly decided?" - still a staple in many law school classes.
25. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION 4 (1997).
[Vol. 60:2:555
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* Placing legal professional training in the university, as
graduate training,26 and removed from total control by
the profession (leading to ongoing debates and tensions
between academic and professional conceptions of the
purposes of legal education 27);
" Developing a relatively uniform system of legal
education, eventually established on a national basis
(with "national," rather than state, law being taught 28 ),
as Harvard educated academic lawyers
disproportionately became law professors and adopted
the Langdellian method throughout the country. 29
In the decades that followed Langdell's deanship and the
establishment of his method at Harvard, the "case method" moved into
most law schools. Thousands of law students for many decades were
taught essentially with the same methods and from the same
casebooks, regardless of region or differing career goals. Parallel to the
development of the university-academic law school, night schools and
part-time schools offered a slightly different form of education. But
after the Reed Report,30 which documented the differences in legal
education and suggested several official tracks for differentiated legal
education, was rejected by the ABA in the 1920s, legal education
began to look the same almost everywhere.
B. Legal Realism's Critiques of the Langdellian "Revolution"
Despite differences among the "founders" of the case method's
different forms of using cases to generate principles (historicist,
26. In most nations law is studied at university or free standing schools as an
undergraduate (non-specialized field of study). Increasingly students from other countries now
study for LLMs in the US or European countries to add to their specialized knowledge and to get
a glimpse of the famous American way of Socratic instruction.
27. See Edwards, supra note 16, at 34.
28. See Peter L. Strauss, Transsystemia - Are we Approaching a New Langdellian Moment?
Is McGill Leading the Way? 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 161(2006).
29. This did not happen as smoothly or easily as it often appears to us now. For many years
Columbia, Yale and the then new University of Chicago Law School curricula were competitors,
and were in fact considered "better" law schools in some circles (e.g., in New York, Wall Street
lawyers came from Columbia). See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 297-305 (1955); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at
67-97 (1986); JOHN SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 15-20
(1995); Robert Gordon, Legal Education and Practice: The Case for (and Against) Harvard, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1995); Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law
Student, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (1934) (reviewing study of social science, facts and "functionalism"
in early twentieth century legal education).
30. ALFRED Z. REED, BASIC TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (The
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 1921).
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analytic, and scientistic31), attacks on the Langdellian teaching
method, and on the jurisprudence of the Lochner32 era, began to
challenge the conceptualism and formalism of these ideas about law.
These criticisms of a "closed" system of limited foundational
principles of law and logically derived rules culminated in a movement
now called "Legal Realism," derived from the claims of "sociological
jurisprudence" urged by Roscoe Pound. 33 Sociological jurisprudence
sought to take account of how the law was actually experienced by
both lawmakers and those upon whom the law acted, as well as to
understand law as it operated in institutions other than courts. This
second "big bang" in legal education, as with all such movements for
educational change, had founders and adherents who actually argued
for many different versions of what they thought the correctives
should be.34 Pound emphasized that law had many "standpoints" and
could be viewed from the perspective of the lawmaker (legislator),
judge, practicing lawyer, client, and the general public (or those who
were expected to follow the law).35
The Legal Realists, in their different ways, reacted to the
rapidly changing economic, technological, and political developments
of the 1920s and 1930s. Legal Realist law professors, both as teachers
and as scholars, found practical influence in their belief in social
engineering through purposive use of law. This belief was taken up in
practice by the New Deal lawyers. Several law professors were in both
groups, moving into government from academe 36 and, in some cases,
moving back into the academy. The Realists at Columbia sought to
reframe the first year of law school to study social problems and not
31. See ALSCHULER, supra note 3, at 98-100 (providing a clean argument about the actual
differences between Langdell and Holmes' approach to the development of law). Alschuler argues
that although Holmes became the hero of the Legal Realist movement, he was in fact as much of
a formalist (in the historicist mode) as Langdell. Id. at 113-14.
32. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down labor-protective legislation
(limited working hours in a bakery) as substantive due process violation and criticized as an
overly formalist reading of workers' "freedom of contract").
33. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1922); Roscoe Pound,
The Scope and Purposes of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911). See also
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM L. REV. 12 (1910) (discussing the
"divorce" between law in books and law in action).
34. For some representations of this work see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND
(1930); FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You LAWYERS (1939); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE LEGAL REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); Jerome Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, 7 AM. L.
SCH. REV. 1063 (1934); Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222
(1931); Max Radin, Legal Realism, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 824 (1931).
35. ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1925).
36. RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 152
(1995).
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only arid categories of private law. 37 They were also interested in the
social structure which both formed law and affected the variability of
its enforcement and compliance.
Karl Llewellyn, the intellectual founder of Legal Realism, saw
the importance of law in its social context, with particular processes
and particular skills being used to advance particular social ends. As
drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, he sought to develop a
"realist" body of law for the operation of commerce as actually
practiced by those who bought and sold goods. As a teacher, he told
students they needed both theory and skills to do their work.
For the Realists, law was in constant flux and was not
comprised of more or less static "concepts," as the Formalists
(Langdellians) saw it. Law was seen as a means to accomplish the
larger society's goals and was not an end in itself. This suggests the
effect of American pragmatism on legal thought, seeing law as
instrumental to achieving particular goals and not as a thing unto
itself. According to the Realists, society's needs are always changing,
so the law must both react to and be a helpmate in developing the
appropriate public policies and uses of law to satisfy society's needs
and solve society's problems. To do this work, modern lawyers needed
different techniques: social science to collect data and understand
problems, as well as methods of evaluating the effects of particular
laws or policies. Society was not homogeneous or monolithic in its
needs, and its variability required more than a few limited
foundational legal principles.
Scholars of the Legal Realist movement have differed over
whether the Realists shared a political vision of reforming law for
"progressive" ends, or whether they were simply united in their
opposition to legal formalism and the earlier generations of legal
scholars and teachers. As a group many of them engaged in empirical
projects, seeking to describe the industries, 38 cultures, 39 or processes 40
they were hoping to affect. Some of them, like Karl Llewellyn, argued,
37. See Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 331, 333 (1951).
38. See, e.g., SECURITIES AND EXcHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937-40) (empirical work on securities markets and the SEC);
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN (1974); Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, Legal
and Institutional Methods Applied to Debiting of Direct Discounts, 40 YALE L.J. 381 (1931).
39. KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE
LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
40. Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Bryant Garth, Of Process and People: Empirical Studies of
Civil Procedure, in LAW'S DISCIPLINARY ENCOUNTERS: NEW FRONTIERS IN LAW'S ENGAGEMENT
WITH THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Terence Halliday et al. eds., forthcoming); Clark & Harry Schulman,
Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Study of Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867 (1934); Soia
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).
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though, for the separation of "is" (description) from "ought"
(prescription or moral judgments), thus adhering to a different form of
"objectivity." For some, like Pound, Legal Realism entailed the
sociological and political study of interest groups that made the law,
thus broadening the study of law outside the sphere of courts and
judges. Others, like Jerome Frank,41 sought to humanize the study of
law by seeing that judges were human beings and thus subject to
social, political, and psychological pressures that affected how they
interpreted law and resolved disputes. This was legal humanism with
social psychology and sociology.
Realists were skeptical of rules and overly abstracted concepts.
They added "materials" to the study of cases and hoped to have
students study the real world that rules were supposed to regulate.
They believed that with the right tools of analysis (and teaching) new
rules and legal processes could be developed to respond to and
ameliorate particular social problems, such as crime, inefficient or
defective business and consumer relations, economic inequalities,
unemployment, accidents, injuries, and poverty. They were interested
in both public and private responsibilities for social problems, and,
with the New Deal, many of them helped launch the great
experiments of the administrative state that became the alphabet
agencies. Law was no longer a "science" of inductive rules or principles
but a "social science" of data gathering and rules-tinkering, modifiable
legislation, and public regulation. Law was seen as the dependent
variable, society the independent variable, and analysis and
evaluation of variability was considered possible and desirable. The
idea was to study law as it actually was "in action," not just "in the
books," with the hope that
creative legal thought will more and more look behind the pretty array of "correct cases"
to the actual facts of judicial behavior, will make increasing use of statistical methods in
the scientific description and prediction of judicial behavior, will more and more seek to
map the hidden springs of judicial decision and to weigh the social forces which are
represented on the bench.
4 2
The Legal Realists produced a wealth of influential academic
work and succeeded in influencing policymakers' and jurists' attitudes
towards the New Deal, but they had a less successful impact on legal
education. While casebooks now contained "materials" to go with the
cases, and some students participated in large empirical projects (at
Columbia, the UCC project with Karl Llewellyn, and the commercial
arbitration project with Soia Mentschikoff, and later, at the University
41. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931).
42. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 833 (1935).
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of Chicago, the Jury Project with Hans Zeisel and Harry Kalven 43),
efforts at Yale, Columbia, and Chicago to radically transform legal
education, to encourage new teaching methods and new approaches to
law largely failed 44. Until new forms of Legal Realism re-emerged in
the modern Law and Society movement 45 and the Critical Legal
Studies movement 46 in the 1960s and 1970s, Legal Realism's major
contribution to legal education was its critique of formalism and of
easy classification of law as rules. It actually did little to change the
structure or performance of legal education.
Although Legal Realism did little to change the structure of
legal education, it left, for all its diversity of scholars, several lasting
impacts on what was studied in legal education. Legal Realism
succeeded in challenging the view that doctrine and appellate cases
were the only things that mattered. Legal "policy" science, such as it
is, can trace its origins to the Realists' conceptions of what law was
supposed to do. In 1943, Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell of Yale
wrote an influential law review article on legal education.47 This
article advocated transforming legal education into a "policy
science"-an artful, if also unsuccessful, effort to combine Langdellian
"science" with Realist social science. Policy was "the making of
important decisions which affect the distribution of values" 48 and, they
argued, should be taught as the "science" of making good policies and
decisions, 49 with data and tools for legal and social scientific analysis,
combined with political purposes and a sense of policy ethics. Another
Realist, Jerome Frank, urged universities to return to apprenticeships
to teach the practice of law. His article, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer
School?,50 later became one of the founding texts of the clinical
education movement.
The Realists also focused on legal processes-how the law was
made and enforced-which spawned the Legal Process school of the
1950's (and later). Thousands of law students were trained, through
43. HANS ZEISEL & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
44. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 29, at 211-257; STEVENS, supra notel7.
45. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
47. Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
48. Id. at 207.
49. Decision science, a hybrid discipline of statistics, mathematics, logic and game theory,
has returned to law schools in the teaching of some skills like negotiation, but its home has been
in public policy and business schools. See, e.g., JOHN HAMMOND, RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD
RAIFFA, SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING BETTER DECISIONS (1999); WISE
CHOICES: DECISIONS, GAMES AND NEGOTIATIONS (Richard J. Zeckhauser, Ralph L. Keeney &
James K. Sebenius eds., 1996).
50. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933).
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the Hart and Sacks temporary edition text,51 to consider questions of
"institutional competence" in the making and enforcement of law in
different settings for different purposes. Process,5 2 both for practicing
lawyers (later to be institutionalized in clinical education5 3) and for
lawmakers and interpreters (the hermeneutics of Critical Legal
Studies and Postmodernism 54), became as important as the substance
and content of doctrinal law.
Whether the Yale policy studies of the 1940s and the Legal
Process school of Hart & Sacks in the 1950s were radical enough to be
called a third or fourth "big bang" in legal education, they had some
influence on what was taught (casebooks with more "materials"
outside of law), how it was taught (more specialty courses, after the
required first- and second-year curricula, and more seminars,
especially in the subject areas of scholars who looked beyond the case
law), and who taught (more social scientists, philosophers, and others
were added to faculties and even the law professors ceased, for the
most part, to be engaged in practice).
C. Law and Economics and Socio-Legal Studies
The next "big bang" in legal studies was the almost
simultaneous founding of two different interdisciplinary studies of
law: one, Law and Economics, was largely successful; and the other,
socio-legal studies or Law and Society, was less so,. Richard Posner 55
and Guido Calabresi 56 wrote field-defining studies applying economics
principles to the development of law in torts and contracts, which
eventually spread to the application of economics principles to most
areas of law. Through this work, they masterfully developed unifying
concepts for study: "efficiency" (or the efficient allocation of resources),
"wealth maximization," and "risk allocation." These evocative concepts
became so omnipresent in legal discourse that scores of law teachers
spent summers at Henry Manne's "summer camp" learning economics
principles so they could teach torts, contracts, insurance, and health
law with new-to-law concepts like "transaction costs," "moral hazard,"
and "externalities." It was no longer enough just to read the cases or
statutes--one had to understand what aggregate impact they were
51. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
52. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of
Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 558-65 (2006).
53. See infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
55. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6-8 (1972).
56. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-40 (1970).
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having on society. Law and Economics successfully infiltrated the
academy in legal analysis, in new concepts taught in basic first-year
courses, and in sponsored fellowship programs, like the Olin
Fellowship. The influence of Law and Economics was also increased by
the appointment of many of its academic adherents to the federal
bench, where Law and Economics concepts could then be enshrined in
decisional law.
Law and Society, as a field, was formed in the late 1960s as an
informal group at the American Sociological Association to link the
study of law with the sub-field of "social problems" in sociology. The
Law and Society Association was formed as an intentionally multi-
disciplinary group of lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists, historians,
psychologists, political scientists, and economists who sought to study
law and legal institutions empirically and in context.57 Willard Hurst
of the University of Wisconsin (which later became a center of socio-
legal studies) authored a deeply contextual study of historical legal
developments, 58 and remade scholarly legal history by demonstrating
how legal history should focus on empirical facts about social factors
and conditions, such as industry structures, rather than chronicling
only legal doctrinal development. 59
Beginning in the 1960s, a group of positivist social scientists
studied courts, crimes, dispute-processing mechanisms, and the "gap"
between the law on the books and the law in action in a variety of
different fields.60 Although socio-legal scholarship spread to several
different academic journals and engaged a large number of legal
scholars, the hoped-for social science summer camp to match Henry
57. The story of the founding of the Law and Society Association and its scholarly project
has also been told many times before. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 764 (1986); Bryant Garth & Joyce Sterling, From Legal Realism
to Law and Society: Reshaping Law for the Last Stages of the Social Activist State, 32 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 409, 417-23 (1998); Felice J. Levine, Goose Bumps and 'The Search for Signs of
Intelligent Life' in Sociolegal Studies: After Twenty-Five Years, 24 LAW & SOC'y REV. 7, 9-12
(1990); Stewart Macauley, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW &
POL Y 149, 150-52 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies: The Importance of
Engaged Social Science in Legal Studies, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 91, 102-04 (1990); Christopher
Tomlins, Framing the Field of Law's Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative, 34 LAW &
Soc'x REV. 911, 953-55 (2000); David Trubeck, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the
Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 46-47 (1990).
58. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 3-19
(1950).
59. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 93-116 (1964).
60. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an




Manne's never really materialized 61 and so legal education has been
hardly affected. 62 Nevertheless, the socio-legal studies movement
continues to press upon legal thought, teaching, and scholarship the
following basic ideas:
* Law is not autonomous; it is shaped by and shapes
human interactions;
* Law exists in institutions, and thus patterns of law
making and law enforcement develop outside of
doctrinal texts and intentions;
" Law is manipulated by the human actors who make and
enforce it, so rules and doctrines do not have a uniform,
independent existence and essence;
* Law is variable; it exists in different cultural forms and
is thus "plural" in composition, interpretation,
compliance, and function; law is "chosen" by particular
communities-it is not a universal "given";
* Those who "use" or make the law have intentions and
interests which are differentially expressed in and
effectuated in law;
* Groups and collectivities form social and
"interpretative" communities that influence the making
and enforcement of laws; laws are not always co-
terminous with social norms;
" Law is not always a matter of formal enactments or
institutions; law and norm enforcement is often the
province of informal groups and disciplinary social
forces;
• Law can be used for liberatory and expressive, or
oppressive and disciplinary, purposes;
* Law's ability to accomplish its professed aims and goals
is variable and subject to a variety of social forces it
cannot entirely control.
61. The Law & Society Association does sponsor a one week summer program seminar in
social science methods used to study legal phenomena, but the participants have generally been
social science graduate students (or students from the one successful graduate program in law
and social science, Berkeley's Jurisprudence and Social Policy program, with few aspiring legal
academics in attendance).
62. A new "school" of legal thought called Behavioral Economics and Law attempts to study
how legal phenomena are experienced and acted on, with a focus on social and cognitive
psychology, as well as on sociology. In my view, this school is mostly re-inventing the socio-legal
studies wheels of explanation, with a little cognitive and social psychology (and some empirical
work) added to conventional Law and Economics analysis. Was anyone paying attention in the
1970s and 1980s, or are economists disproportionately credited when they speak (or analyze)?
For a good review of this literature, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
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D. The Rise of Critical Legal Studies
While many laboring in the social science fields were collecting
data, others, especially those law professors with strong ties to the
rest of the academy, were influenced by one of the "big bangs" in mid-
century academic life-the "interpretative turn" in literary studies.
Derridian 63 and Lacanian6 4 studies of meaning and its variability lent
legal academic theory panache, if not total justification, to the growing
political critique of the "determinism" of law in the 1960s in American
law schools, and helped fuel the movement known as Critical Legal
Studies ("CLS"). With its rabble rousing and stylish leaders, the texts
and practices of CLS exposed the "indeterminacy" of Langdell's legal
principles. For any set of facts, cases could be read to suggest
outcomes that could go either way and be appropriately justified.65
Critical Legal Studies turned into a rather big bang. It
produced hundreds of pages of exciting and inciting scholarship,
radicalized teaching in some quarters, 66 and upset the establishment
so much that Paul Carrington, then Dean at Duke Law School,
demanded that these "nihilists" resign from the legal academy if they
didn't believe in the higher purposes and authority of law. 67 Critical
Legal Studies, officially founded in 1977, was an offshoot of the Law
and Society movement (some of CLS's members continued to study the
political claims of economic and class subordination in the law with
63. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., U. Chicago
1980) (1967).
64. See JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS: THE FIRST COMPLETE EDITION IN ENGLISH (Bruce Fink
trans., Norton 2006) (1966).
65. For some samples of this literature see, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 293, 308-10 (1984); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151,
1222 (1985); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1, 10-14 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An
Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 633 (1984). For more comprehensive
bibliographies of critical legal studies and its arguments, see, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1986); Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 292-93 (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982); Duncan Kennedy & Karl
E. Mare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984). For a more recent
assessment of the impact of critical legal studies, at least on American constitutional
scholarship, see Louis Michael Seidman, Critical Constitutionalism Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
575 (2006).
66. The leading text here is, of course, DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY (NYU Press 2004), initially self-published in 1983 as a pamphlet.
Duncan Kennedy urged a class upending of law schools and for a time taught from the back (not
the front) of the classroom amphitheatre to "de-center" the authority of the professor in the
classroom, just as deconstructionists were "de-centering" the text and the word.
67. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).
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empirical methods 68 ) and the larger New Left political movements of
the 1960s and 1970s. Its organizers came together to explore Marxist
class analysis of the impact of legal institutions and to expose the fact
that law was itself "an instrument of social, economic and political
domination."69 The intention was to make law more of an instrument
of positive social and redistributive change, to revolutionize law
teaching and make it more participatory and democratic, and to
encourage truly critical thinking and action.
Although Critical Legal Studies theorists aligned themselves
with progressive clinicians and legal practitioners, 70 the movement
was largely theoretical and was often criticized for continuing a
fetishistic interest in legal doctrine and cases. Today its scholarship
looks remarkably like conventional legal scholarship, though at the
time it seemed radical in content for its distrust of legal certainties, if
not particularly creative in form or method. Aside from about ten
national conferences that engaged interested law faculty and students,
there was little visible impact on legal education, except for the much
reported political battles that engulfed a few elite institutions like
Harvard 71 and continue to make faculty appointments a political
minefield (or, more accurately, gridlock).
E. Law and Cultural Studies
As a movement more of theory than of practice, Critical Legal
Studies was joined to several other important intellectual
movements-deconstruction in literary theory, a deeper engagement
with the philosophy of law and jurisprudence (as John Rawls, a
political philosopher and theorist,72 and Ronald Dworkin, a law
68. See, e.g., Frank Munger & Carroll Seron, Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal
Theory: A Comment on Method, 6 LAW & POL'Y 257, 275 (1984) (urging that Critical Legal
Studies scholars return to the empirical research methods of the Frankfurt school).
69. See KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 65, at 297 n. 1 (citing the
initial outreach letter from the organizers of the first Conference on Critical Legal Studies, dated
January 17, 1977). I was a member of CLS from the beginning. The first meeting was held in
Madison, Wisconsin in 1977, and the last official meeting was held in Washington, D.C. at
several participating law schools in 1995 (where the demise of class analysis as a result of
"identity politics" was explored and debated by a new generation of legal scholars).
70. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical
Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 370-71 (1982/1983)
("This Article is a first attempt to link the theoretical advances made by the Conference [on
Critical Legal Studies] with the accumulated practical experience of creative [National Lawyers]
Guild attorneys."); David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 6 (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982) ("This book is an attempt to present a progressive,
critical analysis of the operation and social role of the law in contemporary American society.").
71. See Calvin Trillin, A Reporter At Large: Harvard Law, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at
75-76 (telling the stories of hiring battles and other tales of Harvard and CLS encounters).
72. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (1971).
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trained jurisprude, 73 elaborated new foundational concepts like the
"veil of ignorance" and "Hercules, the judge" for legal philosophers to
debate), and a new effort to see law, not as a science or social science,
but as a humanistic field of study.74 Scholars like James Boyd White, 75
Robin West, 76 Richard Weisberg, 77 and Martha Nussbaum 78 focused on
seeing law as a form of literature with appropriate uses of literary
theory, and read fictional texts about law to uncover meanings and
aspirations of law (in a generally more humanistic and positive tone
than Critical Legal Studies' critiques or Law and Economics'
mechanical transaction cost analysis). Later, this more highbrow form
of legal literary analysis gave rise to a more diverse reading of law in
popular culture, 79 in all its forms, to illuminate what law means to the
general public, not just to lawyers.
Again, although the scholarly production was fruitful and
erudite, aside from a few law and literature seminars, the core of legal
education has hardly been touched by these developments, except for a
more informed set of interpretative moves and principles in legal
interpretation. Nevertheless, the law and literature movement has
contributed its own set of basic viewpoints from which we examine
law:
73. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239-40 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 105-10 (1977).
74. See James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985) ("In this paper I shall suggest that law is
most usefully seen not.., as a system of rules, but as a branch of rhetoric."). For one of the most
elegant essays exploring the turn of law and legal study to such methods in other disciplines, see
Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79, 86-89 (1987). As an example of this form of
scholarship, see David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 266-74
(1985).
75. WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 231-74 (1984) (applying a literary critique to the
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and a judicial opinion); JAMES BOYD WHITE,
HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 77 (1985); JAMES BOYD
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 8-13 (1973) (using Mark Twain's Life on the Mississippi to teach
"the language of the law").
76. ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 345 (1993) ("[L]egal theory itself
contains a substantial narrative component that can be analyzed as literature.").
77. RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS, AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 3
(1992) ("[L]iterature provides unique insights into the underpinnings of law and.., stories and
poems stand as sources of law."); RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE
PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION (1984) (analyzing eight fictional works with lawyer
protagonists).
78. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE
79-80 (1995) (reflecting on the role of a judge as a type of poet).
79. See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW & PAUL BERGMAN, REEL JUSTICE ixx (2nd ed. 2006)
(analyzying courtroom movies to "enhance your understanding of our legal system while helping
you think through the messages about law, lawyers, and the legal system that the films convey");
MICHAEL ASIMOW & SHANNON MADER, LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE: A COURSE BOOK 6-8 (2004)
(examining "[t]he relationship between popular culture and the law"); DAVID PAPKE ET AL., LAW
AND POPULAR CULTURE: A TEACHING COMPANION (forthcoming 2007).
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* Law is a text;
* Law must be interpreted and different "readers" will
interpret differently; thus there are "communities of
interpretation";8 0
* Law produces its own language, with its own rules of
grammar and structure;
* The lawyer/judge is a "creator" of language, or "literary
agent," in his use of and interpretation of words;
* We learn about law's meanings by studying literature
that depicts ordinary (and extraordinary) people
engaging with the law and its institutions;
* Law, like literature, tells a narrative story, and we can
use narrative structures for good (persuasion and
empathy) or ill (manipulation, deception, falsity);
" Law is a humanistic discipline-it is made by humans,
for human consumption and transformation; it does not
exist apart from its use by human beings;
" As a humanistic enterprise, the study of law and
literature can help us evaluate whether law tells
good/ethical or evil/unjust stories and can help us clarify
basic human values.8 1
F. The Addition of Ethics
While the law and literature movement sought to understand
basic human ethics, the legal profession was rocked by another major
"big bang" with the 1974 revelations of the break-in at the Democratic
National Committee's office at the Watergate in Washington, D.C.
Following national attention on presidential succession, a little
understood document from John Dean, one of President Nixon's
counsel, exposed how many lawyers were involved in the cover-up of
criminal wrongdoing. As a result, one of the most major formal
alterations to legal education in many years was made when the ABA
required a course in professional responsibility of each graduating law
student-the first such official requirement for anything beyond the
first year for formal legal education accreditation.8 2 With the belief
80. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 356-57 (1980).
81. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 78, at 54 (exploring the use of law and literature as a point
for ethical discourse); see also Robin West, Law and Fancy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1851, 1857 (1997)
(reviewing POETIC JUSTICE).
82. See ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302(a)(5) (2005-2006),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaledlstandards/2005-2006standardsbook.pdf (requiring
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that education really can affect moral dispositions, new scholarship,
teaching methods, and a variety of different forms of ethics instruction
were added to the usual diet of private and public law courses.8 3
G. "Outsider" Jurisprudence
The law professoriate became more diverse in the 1970s and
1980s. This increased diversity affected what was studied in law
schools. The growth of the numbers of women and minorities in the
legal teaching profession, coupled with political and social movements
outside of the academy, gave voice to what was generically called
"outsider jurisprudence." Legal Feminism began by looking at how the
law discriminated against and regulated women and then launched a
deeper intellectual attack by focusing on how the law had been
conceptualized by men, for masculine usage and domination,8 4 while it
had ignored or silenced women's legal needs.85 Critical Race Theorists
of all colors challenged both traditional legal orthodoxy and also the
Critical Legal Studies critique of rights.8 6 Feminists and race theorists
both criticized and embraced law. Law, having been successfully used
to expand some, if not all, civil rights, was sometimes, but not always,
an effective tool for "dismantling the master's house."8 7 Feminism and
Critical Race Theory began with separate courses and new texts, but
ultimately hoped to move into and transform the mainstream of legal
education by broadening content, as well as by diversifying the
participants in the lawmaking and interpreting process.
Law and Economics scholars may have added new concepts or
ways of analysis, like Coase's transaction cost theorem.88 However,
feminists and race theorists created new legal causes of action, such as
"substantial instruction in ... the history, goals, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities of
the legal profession and its members").
83. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 200-03 (2000) (chronicling the post-
Watergate rise of courses in professional responsibility); Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 5 (1995).
84. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 648 (1983) (examining how rape law denigrates women);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 1493 (1992).
85. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 84-85 (1987).
86. For a discussion of common criticisms of the Critical Legal Studies approach, see Mari
J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 323, 330-62 (1987).
87. AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110, 112 (1984).
88. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-19 (1960).
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sexual harassment 9 and reparations for the harms of slavery, 90 and
also argued for new methods of learning and thinking. 91 Indeed, in the
academy at large, radical changes to pedagogy from participatory
models in Women's Studies led to "consciousness raising"-like
methodologies in law school seminars and even some traditional
classes. This change in classroom dialogue in law schools can be traced
to the practice of the women's movement as it moved itself into more
formal locations in education generally. 92
Feminism and Critical Race Theory continued in theory what
Critical Legal Studies had begun-the critique of law as "neutral" or
"objective." Its scholarship challenged the making and enforcement of
law as differentially beneficial and harmful, while privileging the
dominant classes of whites and men. These intellectual movements
mixed traditional legal argument, the use of statistics, teachings from
social science and other disciplines, 93 and postmodern theories of
identity politics. 94 In so doing, they challenged basic categories of
understanding in law, just as Postmodernism challenged all basic
"truth" claims in late twentieth century intellectual life.95
H. Big Bangs of the Late Twentieth Century: The New Pragmatism
What has emerged from the intellectual ferment of the late
twentieth century is alternatively called "skepticism" or "the new
pragmatism." 96 While first-year class subjects look the same in title as
they did over one hundred years ago, the content may be quite altered.
Property texts challenge theories of conquest and ownership by
juxtaposing current mainstream attitudes towards property and
89. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
90. See Charles Ogletree, Jr., Reparations: A Fundamental Issue of Social Justice, THE
BLACK COLLEGIAN, Oct. 1, 2002, at 118.
91. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
92. See, e.g., MARY BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women's Ways of "Knowing" Law:
Feminist Legal Epistemology, Pedagogy, and Jurisprudence, in KNOWLEDGE, DIFFERENCE AND
POWER: ESSAYS INSPIRED BY WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING 57 (Nancy Goldberger et al. eds.,
1996).
93. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
94. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
95. See JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY (1994); JEAN FRANCOIS
LYOTARD, THE POST-MODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984); PAULINE ROSENAU,
POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS AND INTRUSIONS (1992).
96. See, e.g., PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds.,
1991).
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ownership with Native American communal theories of ownership. 97
Criminal law embraces philosophical concepts of guilt and
responsibility. Civil procedure looks at process more broadly, including
informal processes commonly called "alternative dispute resolution,"
and how people frequently resolve disputes informally. 98 A growing
push by many scholars has re-emphasized the importance of statutory
analysis in any thorough legal education.99 And increasingly, attention
in law schools has shifted from an emphasis on private law subjects to
the importance of public law and regulation. 100
Perhaps the greatest "big bang" effect on legal education has
been the growth of clinical education. Although largely still separated
from traditional legal education and lacking the transformative effects
its founders desired and predicted, 10 1 virtually all law schools now
offer students the opportunity to learn to practice law in some kind of
supervised setting that is intentionally designed to focus
simultaneously on both the theory and skills of lawyering. Taking up
the challenge of the Legal Realists, especially Jerome Frank, we now
have some form of "clinical lawyer school" in each law school, where
students learn some of the basic skills of interviewing, counseling,
representing, advocating, writing, negotiating, and lobbying on behalf
of clients, or lawmaking in court or legislative internships. There are
many organizing principles for clinical legal education. These
principles include decisionmaking, whether by client10 2 or lawyer;
competency in particular skills sets; social change and law reform;10 3
civic organizing or advocacy; 10 4 and lawmaking itself (in the newer
legislation clinics).Clinical education sees its mission as placing law in
97. See, e.g., JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (3rd ed.
2002).
98. See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(2nd prtg. 2005); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2004).
99. See, e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (3rd ed. 2001).
100. See, e.g., LISA HEINZERLING & MARK TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS (2006); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST BENEFIT STATE: THE
FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).
101. I know; I am one of them. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Legal
Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555 (1980); see also Gary Bellow, On
Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Methodology, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (Council on Legal Educ. Profl Dev. ed., 1973).
102. DAVID BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed.
2004).
103. See Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the
"New Public Interest Law', 2005 WIS. L. REV. 455.
104. See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing,
48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001).
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context and teaching students to understand the theory of law as it is
applied in practice, as well as creating a sufficiently self-reflective
approach to lawyering that life-long self-critique and feedback will
continue beyond formal education.
Although there have been many efforts by the ABA and the
profession to enforce more radical change through clinical and
practical approaches to legal education (e.g., the MacCrate Report105 ),
clinical education now stands beside conventional classroom and
casebook legal education. In the best programs there is room for every
student who wants to take a clinical course and in a few schools some
clinical education is required of every student. 10 6 But formal
integration of the relationship of the theory of practice to practice
itself is still a dream on the horizon. 10 7 With schisms between those
who see the purpose of clinical education as simply teaching lawyering
skills and those who see the function of the university as promoting
particular concepts of social good through lawyering, coupled with a
continuing disdain or skepticism from increasingly academic law
professors, 108 clinical education (with all of its status and legitimacy
issues) is now a permanent offshoot of its own, providing minimal
challenge to conventional legal education. In the better law school
programs there may be some substantive-clinical collaboration, such
as substantive sequenced courses required before practice or use of
clinical problems or cases in seminars or substantive classes. In some
schools, the first-year legal research and writing program has become
more clinical, focusing on skills other than "only" writing and
research, and often tied to one of the substantive courses in order to
build "thinking and doing" like a lawyer simultaneously.10 9
Just as the clinical pioneers sought to focus legal educators on
the behavior of lawyers, clients, and judges for teaching purposes, the
most recent "big bang" in legal education has been an effort to marry
social science (putting law and economics together with social and
cognitive psychology) and law in a behavioral focus on what legal
decisionmakers actually do. This new "behavioral" move in legal
105. SECTION OF LEGAL ED. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) (widely known as
"the MacCrate Report," named for its Chair, Robert MacCrate, a retired Sullivan & Cromwell
member who advocated that legal education be reorganized according to a set of practical skills
and values).
106. For example, The University of New Mexico School of Law and The City University of
New York School of Law.
107. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical
Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577 (1987).
108. For an early and eloquent version of this issue, see Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher:
A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637 (1968).
109. For example, the New York University School of Law's "Lawyering Program."
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scholarship has looked at a slightly broader set of actors-corporation
board members, government decisionmakers, legislators, negotiators,
judges, clients, and NGOs, as well as lawyers. The advent of this
"new" scholarship, 1 0 which exposes cognitive errors, bad heuristics,
and the false assumptions legal decisionmakers make, is intended to
instill greater self-consciousness, rigor, and empirical reality into
what legal decisionmakers look at when evaluating legal choices and
risks. To the extent that some of this work has already led to new
texts and courses encouraging law students to study statistics,
decision sciences, and other quantitative, as well as qualitative,
methods11 ' of legal analysis, there is some evidence that legal
education may, in fact, finally take the "dismal science" and its
relatives seriously.
This is a very much abbreviated tour d'horizon of the important
twists and turns in legal education. Despite my use of the phrase "big
bang," the truth is that the only really big bang has been Langdell's. If
one looked at the schoolroom, the hospital, the police station, the
prison, or the business office of the nineteenth century, and then
compared it to today's institutions, one would see more change in each
of these than in the law school classroom.
To the extent that change has been desired by some in legal
education, it has succeeded only with heavily funded initiatives from
outside of the legal academy. The most successful of these has been
the Ford Foundation's massive infusion of millions of dollars to law
schools for clinical education ("CLEPR"),11 2 followed closely by the Olin
Foundation's support of Law and Economics scholarship and other
initiatives. Efforts by the Russell Sage Foundation to seed law and
social science11 3 approaches to legal study were more modest (and took
root in only a few schools-Wisconsin, Denver, Buffalo, and, for some
time, Yale and Chicago). Efforts by the Keck Foundation in the 1990s
to make legal ethics more core to legal education were largely
abandoned after a short five year effort. Outside sources of research
funds (like the National Science Foundation in the public sphere and
RAND and private corporations in the private sphere) have supported
110. As I have argued above, for me, this work is somewhat repetitive of early law and
society work, just applied in different places, but I guess every generation has to have a new
project. See Symposium, New Legal Realism, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 335.
111. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS (Howell E. Jackson
ed., 2003).
112. The Council of Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, itself funded by the Ford
Foundation, funded clinical education in American law schools for over twenty years.
113. However, there has been a lot of ink spilled on the issue over the years, including in the
pages of the Journal of Legal Education, the reports of various ABA Task Forces, and in
Association of American Law Schools mini-workshops. See also HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS
EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1973).
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and helped redirect some legal scholarship and there has even been
some governmental support of pedagogical change (FIPSE's 14 funding
of initiatives in alternative dispute resolution at Missouri-
Columbia, 115 and first-year interdisciplinary study at GeorgetownI 16).
However, a major rethinking of legal education has not occurred,
really, in over one hundred years.
So, what kind of "big bang" would I propose? In my view, legal
education should take very seriously, through formal inclusion and
within current structures, the interdisciplinary study of law,
recognizing that there are social causes and effects on law and legal
institutions, before, during, and after "the law" as doctrine.
III. TRUE INTERDISCIPLINAREITY: BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER "THE
LAW"
In my ideal legal curriculum the study of law could be
organized around a "holy trinity"117 of temporal approaches to law-
before, during, and after "the law" as doctrine, 118 which would situate
law and its functions in a broader human context. Traditional law
study would be preceded, in the first year (or "before" the law), by
study of those fields whose knowledge base informs how and why law
is made-sociology, history, political philosophy, political science, and
anthropology-so law students could learn about the historical and
cultural variations in how human beings create and enforce norms for
their coexistence (which has been both peaceful and not!). In the first-
year of study, a beginning law student should also encounter (as many
medical students do now) a real or simulated "client" (whether
individual or group) to understand how legal problems present
themselves. Thus, students would learn simultaneously about how law
came about and what it can and cannot do to solve social and human
problems. Such teaching would ask, as its central themes, what
114. The Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary Education, a funding program within
the U.S. Department of Education.
115. See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS ix n.1 (3d ed. 2005).
116. See infra Part IV.A-B.
117. I guess almost fifteen years at a Catholic institution has affected my metaphors! But, it
is also convenient here since I do not revisit the number of years of an optimal legal education
and instead keep to the current three year program offered at virtually all law schools.
118. This of course makes it easier to construct a new curriculum within the current three
year program, though over the years there have been many proposals for both shorter (two year)
and longer (four year) programs of law study, such as SCALE (two-year program at
Southwestern Law School) and the University of Michigan's two-and-a-half year program, among
others. Southwestern Law School, SCALE - Two-Year J.D. Program, http://www.swlaw.edu
/academics/ jdlscale; The University of Michigan Law School, Frequently Asked Questions:
Summer Starters, http://www.law.umich.edu/prospectivestudents/ admissions/ faq.htm#summer;
see PACKER & EHRLICH, supra note 113, at 37-46.
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produces the norms by which people live and guide themselves and
others, how do those norms vary in different cultural and social
settings, and what predispositions or patterns occur in different social
groupings.
Students would study basic anthropology, sociology, and
history of legal systems with some comparative focus (Roman law,
Anglo-American "common" law, and some introduction to civil law in
Europe and South America or Japan). In this first-year, students
would also be introduced to one or more basic private law subjects
(contracts, property), one public law subject (Constitutional law), as
well as basic adjectival or procedural law (see description of Process
and Society course at Georgetown in Part IV.B below).
In addition, students would encounter a client, learn about
interviewing (to discover basic facts, the individual context of every
legal problem), and then begin to learn about legal research and
writing in the context of a concrete problem. 119 In a first-year seminar,
small groups of students would grapple with beginning jurisprudential
questions such as whether law serves as a constraint on human
behavior or is enabling or empowering, what social purposes are
served by formal norms and their enforcement, and whether law and
morality can be separated (the Hart-Fuller-Dworkin 120  basic
jurisprudential questions). A separate skills seminar could focus on
the beginning tools that lawyers need to develop their legal
competency-briefing cases, learning statutory construction and
interpretation principles, basic argumentation in oral and written
forms, and basic legal interviewing and counseling skills.
The second year, "during" the law, would look most like present
conventional legal education, with study of particular subject fields of
law (torts, corporations, taxation, estate law, administrative law,
international law, environmental law, family law, criminal law),
taught with cases, statutes, regulations, and secondary commentaries.
In addition, each student would be exposed to a course on legal
institutions and how they function (courses on federal courts
(including the structure and administration of justice, as well as
doctrine), legislation, administrative regulation, local government law
119. This model replicates what has been going on in problem-based education in medical
school in Canada and the United States. See, e.g., Harvard Medical School, Department of Social
Medicine, Academic Programs, http://www.hms.harvard.edu/dsmWorkFiles/html/academics/
academics.html ("Members of the Department move systematically between social research and
clinical application and teaching through the Department's Clinical Programs.").
120. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 73, at 96-98; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 168-86 (rev. ed. 1969); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6-13 (2d ed. 1994).
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and procedure), like the Hart & Sacks Legal Process course. 121
Students would also take a basic course on the legal profession
(combining ethics and the sociology of the profession they are about to
enter, with a focus on critical issues in legal professionalism). The
second year would have some required elements (as my own second
year in law school did 122), including some form of organization law
(corporations and non-profits, with some organizational development
learning from sociology and business disciplines), accounting,
statistics, economics, and other quantitative disciplines needed to
understand and evaluate what law aims to accomplish in regulation.
In addition, students might specialize in particular aspects of
using law (international law, judging, lawmaking through legislative
advocacy) and study particular subject areas through different
experiential formats (in class, through simulation, in externships or
internships, and some clinical experience). In the second year all
students should have more advanced exposure to legal concepts, skills
(simulated courses in negotiation, trial skills, client counseling,
legislative drafting), and a comparative understanding of law (as
"chosen" by different peoples, rather than "given" and uniform). They
should be ready to test their knowledge in actual practice in summer
clerkships that would have some academic reporting and reflection
requirement.
In this curriculum, all basic legal skills would be honed in
simulated form in the second year-interviewing, fact investigating,
counseling, negotiating, questioning, and various forms of legal
writing, such as motions, opinion letters, briefs, transaction
documents, and planning documents. Students would also write more
scholarly research papers on particular issues to gain some sense of
academic mastery and competence.
In the third year, after some practical experience in summer
clerkships or internships, the "after" portion of the law curriculum
would involve student specialization or concentration in a particular
field of law, a course in social science methods for evaluation (to help
assess the efficacy of and compliance with the law so that each student
might begin to answer the questions of whether law and legal
121. In my own legal education this course was called Judicial Process (though it treated
much more than court processes), was required of all first-year students, and used the Hart &
Sacks Legal Process materials. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW iii (Tentative ed. 1958); see William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HART & SACKS, supra, at li.
122. My second year of law school (1972) at the University of Pennsylvania required study of
Corporations, Taxation, Accounting, Evidence and Constitutional Law. By the time I began
teaching at Penn in 1975 only the first year was required (and included a regulatory course,
either Labor Law or Social Welfare, called Income Security (the latter a brainchild of the now-
deceased Edward Sparer and my long-time friend, mentor and colleague, Howard Lesnick).
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institutions actually deliver what they promise in terms of rights,
social order, and justice), live clinical experience in a desired area of
law (with rigorous feedback and reflection components), and a
capstone seminar to deal with a final jurisprudential reflection for
students who will primarily be practicing lawyers. This third year
should also provide opportunities for different tracks of study for those
who wish to study more deeply and specialize substantively or
procedurally (such as those students who want to train for academic
positions, permanent judicial clerkships or judicial administration
work, business or government leadership, mediation, or legislative
activity).
This tri-partite legal education would have less doctrinal and
substantive law in it. It also might cut too broadly across too many
different fields for many of today's professors and students. But, in my
view, such a broader, more "liberal" education in law would better
prepare students who will both need to specialize and know how to
"re-tool" in the face of technological, economic, social, and
international developments that will radically change most of what
they learn in a three year program at the beginning of their careers.
In my view, this form of legal study would be "nested" in a
variety of core and hybrid disciplines that affect how law is made,
interpreted, practiced, and enforced. Those disciplines should be
explicitly studied. The disciplines and the questions they present for
contextualized legal study are:
* Political philosophy. Why do we need laws,
constitutions, governance? What forms of governance
are appropriate to different polities-for example,
democracy, republicanism, separation of powers,
parliamentary systems, monarchy, dictatorships, or
planned (socialist) systems? How should we evaluate
the legitimacy of a particular legal system-self-
determination, fair distribution of resources and
opportunity, power relations between the governing and
the governed? What stories of origin inform legal
institutions (Hobbes' Leviathan and social contract,
Rousseau's "natural contract")?
* Moral philosophy. How should human beings deal with
each other? What are they actually capable of
(behavioral moral philosophy)? Are there moral
universals? 123 What responsibilities do we owe to each
123. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT VOLUME 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 68-69, 274-75 (1981); Matthias
Mahlmann & John Mikhail, Cognitive Science, Ethics and Law, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND
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other (and to others outside of our own legal systems) to
create a just world?124 How do we effectuate ethical or
"norming" behavior?
* Cultural anthropology. What human variations are
there in norm creation and compliance and
enforcement? 125 What are the methods of social control
in any given society? How do we study and make sense
of legal pluralism, the many different and variable
approaches to legal problems? What cultural
"dispositions" to the rule of law or resistance to law can
we observe? What incentives and disincentives to law
work in different cultural settings?
" History. (legal, American, and comparative). What are
the foundational events in American law-Constitution
framing, slavery, the Civil War, the New Deal, the Civil
Rights movement?126 What are the sources of our legal
heritage (British legal history)? How do we explain
regime changes, the differential "uptake" and diffusion
of legal ideas (e.g., equality) at different points in time?
How are legal ideas transmitted and diffused
(federal/state relations; international influences, e.g.,
the United Nations Charter of Human Rights)?
* Economics. How do we measure the worth and value of
legal rules? When are they efficient? How should we
employ cost-benefit analysis?127 What are the incentives
and disincentives that affect human and institutional
choices? What are economically optimal ways of
structuring legal rules? For what purposes? Wealth
maximization? Redistribution? What is optimal social
welfare? 128
ONTOLOGY 95 (Zenon Bankowsi ed., 2005); John Mikhail, Moral Heuristics or Moral
Competence?, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 540 (2005).
124. This is a question now discussed in much legal scholarship on international human
rights and morality. See, e.g., MICHAEL IGNATIEFF,, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN
AGE OF TERROR 167-70 (2004); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 9-23 (1984); JOHN
RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 3-10 (1999); David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity,
29 YALE J. INT'L LAW 85 137-39 (2004).
125. Some of this work is now part of modern legal scholarship on social norms, from both
law and economics and behavioral psychology perspectives. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS 11-35 (2000).
126. These are Bruce Ackerman's "constitutional moments." See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 7-10, 346 (1998).
127. For a critique of cost-benefit analysis see FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING,
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35-40 (2004).
128. LoUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18-28 (2002).
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" Sociology. How do human beings form groups and
patterns of behavior? How are legal institutions
structured for effectiveness? What social forces affect
compliance or resistance to law? 129
* Psychology. What are the influences on human
action? 130 How do we act, with what motivations,
intentions, heuristics? What are the rewards and
sanctions that affect our behavior or our cognitions?
What are the relationships between feeling, thinking,
and acting?
" Game Theory and strategic behavior. How do we plan for
and act in situations of strategic interaction with others,
with and without formal communication? 131
* Decision Sciences. How are good predictions made for
making decisions about courses of action in the face of
uncertainty?13 2 What data do we need? What tools of
data analysis do we need? How do we assess risk
aversion and preferences? How do we assess different
value structures (satisficing 33 or optimizing)? What
legal and non-legal factors go into good decisionmaking?
What expertise do we need to call on for good
decisionmaking and problem solving?1 34
* Conflict resolution and process studies. What are the
appropriate processes to solve legal and social problems
and to design systems for effective dispute resolution,
transaction planning, and organizational effectiveness?
How do we diagnose conflict? When do we "intervene" in
conflict? When do we transcend particular legal systems
129. See, e.g., JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 4-10 (1988) (describing the thrill of law
violation among criminals which reduces the effectiveness of "rationally" based deterrence
theories of criminal law).
130. See, e.g., ROBERT CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION xiii-xiv
(1993).
131. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 1, 6-7, 79-80 (1994); AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING
STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 31-55
(1991); THOMAS C. SCHELLING., THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 53-80 (1960).
132. See, e.g., HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 49, at 109-25 (1999); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD
RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 275-78 (1989). For some
effort to import some of this work into the legal curriculum that has already occured, see also
KAPLOW ET AL., supra note 111, at 8-11.
133. See HUNTER CROWTHER-HEYCK, HERBERT A. SIMON: THE BOUNDS OF REASON IN
MODERN AMERICA 192 (2005); JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 4 (2d ed.
1993); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 118-20 (4th ed. 1997).
134. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 329-32 (1995).
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(international dispute resolution)? How do we assess the
effectiveness of conflict resolution? 135
Others might well add other inter- or transdisciplinary fields of
study, either for method (e.g., literary criticism and close textual
analysis; scientific methods) or content (e.g., religion for natural law
studies), but in my view, the fields listed above, whether core or
discrete fields or more hybrid or applied fields (game theory, decision
sciences, conflict resolution), are essential to any full understanding of
modern legal institutions.
IV. SOME EXAMPLES OF INTERDISCIPLINAREITY IN CURRENT LEGAL
EDUCATION
To illustrate how true interdisciplinarity can be achieved in
legal education, I will briefly describe three currently existing
applications. I have had personal involvement in all of these
programs; two are from my own school, Georgetown University Law
Center. I will describe them in order of ambition, beginning with the
most modest and incremental and concluding with an effort to
radically transform all of legal education in a new and completely
innovative law school in Mexico City.
A. Week One: Law in a Global Context at Georgetown Law Center
Within the last five years most legal educators have observed
the need for our legal education to broaden its scope to consider
"transnational" legal problems. 136 So much of what our students will
be dealing with will involve transactions and litigation that cross
borders, as international trade and commerce becomes the ordinary
way of doing business in an increasingly "globalized" world.
After a year of committee study, Georgetown Law Center
created a new program called Week One: Law in a Global Context,
which was piloted in the spring 2006 semester. Week One involved a
multidimensional introduction to problems of transnational legal
significance using a variety of teaching methods and introduction to
lawyering skills. In the first week of their second semester of law
school, the entire first-year class (including our evening division)
135. See, e.g., MORTON DEUTSCH, PETER T. COLEMAN & ERIC C. MARCUS, THE HANDBOOK OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 22-39 (2000); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL.,
supra note 98, at 34-40; MICHAEL L. MOFFITT & ROBERT C. BORDONE, THE HANDBOOK OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 386-404 (2005).
136. NYU School of Law, Hauser Global Law School Program, http://www.nyulawglobal.org;
see Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160, 160-62 (2004).
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engaged in a week-long problem set which drew from several different
subject areas. (First-year "regular" courses began a week later.)
A group of faculty drafted three separate problems, each
containing a complex fact situation and readings which consisted of
cases, relevant statutes, law review articles, treaties, treatises, social
science studies, and other materials. We aimed for no more than about
120 pages of reading for the entire week and planned fifteen to
eighteen hours of classes for the week (with students completing
several homework assignments outside of class time). One problem
involved constitutional and criminal law issues with an international
human rights treaty (the extradition to the United States of a charged
terrorist being held in a country that adhered to a no extradition
policy where the death penalty might be ordered). A second problem
focused on an international defamation on the internet, which
involved issues of international jurisdiction, international and cultural
variations in defamation law, and dispute resolution in transnational
settings (the dispute at issue culminated in an arbitration hearing).
The third problem involved a major economic development project for
the construction of a dam in Laos, and contracts between American
and French contractors who failed to specify choice of law or choice of
forum clauses in their multi-national contracts. Students explored
how each nation would rule on contract disputes substantively,
whether the Convention on the International Sale of Goods could
specify an answer to a difficult question of potential contract breach,
and what forms of dispute resolution would be most appropriate here
(international litigation and enforcement of a foreign judgment, or
arbitration and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award). These three
problems were chosen to extend the curriculum already studied by
each of five first-year sections (two sections focused on the
constitutional and criminal law problem; two on the contracts and
procedure for international dispute resolution problem; and one on the
torts and dispute resolution problem). This year we will create more
problems and will have different section assignments of problems.
During Week One each student read a variety of materials
beyond traditional cases and doctrine and engaged in several skills-
based exercises. Classes ranged from large plenary sessions to smaller
discussion groups led by faculty and a group of "Global Teaching
Fellows" (a selected group of international LLM students and third-
year students with international law interests' 37). Every first-year
student engaged in at least one lawyering "performance" activity.
137. Georgetown has a special Global Law Scholars program for a small group of selected JD
students. Georgetown Law, Global Legal Scholars, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gls
(describing the program and Week One).
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Students negotiated contract clauses (for dispute resolution choices),
argued motions for criminal extradition, arbitral, or judgment
enforcement, and/or conducted portions of arbitration hearings. They
worked individually and in small working groups and prepared
several short written assignments as well. Week One is, thus far, a
Pass/No-Credit (attendance mandatory) one-unit course, now required
of all first-year students at Georgetown. Each Week One segment
concluded with a panel of practicing lawyers and scholars who
discussed the legal, political, diplomatic, and practice issues
implicated in the problems. Some of the panels also discussed career
issues for those seeking to work as "transnational" lawyers.
The evaluations of this program were overwhelmingly positive
(both for the transnational content and the experiential-problem based
teaching method) and the experiment will be continued. The
pedagogical purposes of introducing students to modern "out-of-the
legal-category" problem solving, with a deeper understanding of the
layers of legal pluralism (international law, transnational law, treaty
law, national law, conflicts of law, and enforcement outside of
particular jurisdictions, as well as cultural legal differences-e.g., civil
vs. common law differences in substance and procedure), were largely
achieved, though we still consider this a work-in-progress for
improvement and refinement.
Week One represented an enormous effort on the part of
participating faculty. Ten of us, led by then-Associate Dean and
comparative constitutionalist Professor Vicki Jackson, were the
principal teachers and problem drafters. Another forty-plus faculty
participated in leading small group discussions, along with about fifty
Global Teaching Fellows. The Registrar's Office administered the
structuring of the exercises, production of readings, and management
of class schedules and rooms. This enormous effort presents a
relatively small, incremental change in the first-year curriculum with
a great deal of impact. Some schools have similar "bridge week"
exercises, in which a topic is taught without being tied to a particular
doctrinal course and multiple faculty members participate. The model
is easily adaptable to accomplish a variety of legal education
innovations. For example, the "bridge week" can be used to introduce
students to international law, lawyering practice, law and social
science and economics, jurisprudence, or legal ethics. Such programs
can be used to demonstrate the "nested" nature of legal studies in
other fields and to make learning a more active, and less passive,
activity. Bridge weeks like this depend on dedicated and
interdisciplinary (and multi-skilled) faculty, a commitment to
institutionalize changes in law school structures, and a flexible, large,
and dedicated administrative staff.
588 [Vol. 60:2:555
BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER "THE LAW'"
B. Curriculum B: An "Integrated" First-year Curriculum at
Georgetown Law Center
Fifteen years earlier, a group of interdisciplinary law
professors and scholars developed an even more ambitious effort to
reframe the first-year curriculum. Called alternately "Curriculum B"
or "Section 3" (for the number of the first-year section that has come to
house this curriculum; there are three other "traditional" first-year
sections and a fifth evening division first-year section at Georgetown),
one whole section of the first-year class now studies all of its first-year
subjects within an interdisciplinary focus. With the assistance of a
Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education ("FIPSE")
grant from the Department of Education in 1990, six Georgetown
faculty were released from teaching for one year to create an
alternative first-year program. The courses were completely recrafted,
to include new and separate materials (including cases and materials
from other disciplines), and a gifted group of teachers taught the
program for the first few years. Two keys to the success of Section 3
have been the size and depth of participation of the Georgetown
faculty. We are now at least three or four deep in faculty members
who are willing to teach each class, so that although each professor
may leave his or her footprint on the course, we have depth and
continuity of coverage, as well as firm commitment to the program.
The new "integrated" program of legal study was intended to:
"1) reconceive separate subject matters in terms of common problems
such as incentives, distribution and social control; 2) fully take into
account the emergence of the regulatory state and pervasive
legislation in most common law areas; 3) invoke other academic
disciplines as they bear on law and 4) teach theory, as well as
doctrinal analysis of law."138 The courses consist of:
* Property in Time. A four-unit, one-semester course in
legal history, law and economics, and traditional
property concepts;
* Legal Process and Society. A five-unit, two-semester
course in legal procedure, dispute resolution, and socio-
legal study of legal processes, both formal and informal,
civil and criminal, judicial, regulatory, and legislative
(with court visits and other experiential exercises,
including complaint drafting and discovery);
138. Louis M. Seidman, Georgetown University Law Center, Proposal for Reform of First
Year Curriculum for U.S. Law Schools (1989) (submitted to Fund for the Improvement of
Postsecondary Education) (on file with author).
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" Bargain, Exchange and Liability. A six-unit, two-
semester course in contracts, torts, law and economics,
risk analysis, and legal policy, focusing on relations
between strangers and relations between those who
know each other, when creating legal relationships;
* Democracy and Coercion. A four-unit, one-semester
course in constitutional law and political theory with
special attention to both criminal law and civil liberties,
exploring the powers of the state, theories of democratic
participation and limitations on state power, and the
tensions between democracy and individualism;
" Government Processes. A four-unit, one-semester,
problem-based course on the regulatory state, with a
focus on a particular area of regulation, such as
workplace safety, environmental hazards, and related
problems;
* Legal Justice. A three-unit, one-semester, small group
seminar and lecture series intended to introduce
students to jurisprudence, legal theory, and the
chronological progression of several schools of legal
thought (Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, Critical
Legal Studies, Law and Economics, Jurisprudence,
Legal Feminism, Critical Race Theory, Postmodernism,
Pragmatism, and the New Behaviorism), and to provide
a place for discussion for integrating all of these courses.
* Legal Practice: Analysis and Writing. A three-unit, two-
semester course with all Section 3 students taught by
the same set of Legal Research and Writing instructors,
who coordinate exercises (and pro bono activities) with
the substantive curriculum. Students learn analytic and
rhetorical skills, and legal research, planning, writing,
and oral argument.
Teaching methodologies vary by instructor, and all classes but
the Legal Justice seminar are taught in large groups, but some
instructors use writing exercises, take-home exams, and field trips to
alter the conventional pedagogical diet. This program has been
operational for over fifteen years and has been evaluated both
internally and externally. Students self-select for this section (which is
the same size as the traditional sections). They know they might have
more diverse reading assignments than their peers, but they also are
more likely to be committed to public interest, or to international or
non-conventional legal practice. Students in this section often feel as if
they have had an enriched legal education and they fare well in the
job market (e.g., judicial clerkships, as well as conventional law firm
[Vol. 60:2:555590
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jobs), where they enjoy explaining the content of their "renamed"
courses to lawyers who have had more conventional legal educations.
C. The Problem-Based Law School: CIDE in Mexico City
For the most ambitious-to-date effort to create an entirely
interdisciplinary and problem-based law school, one has to leave our
country. A little over five years ago, a dedicated and brilliant group of
Mexican legal educators, working with a core group of Stanford Law
faculty, and supported by both the Mexican government and the
American William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, set out to create a
whole new law school to challenge the traditional civil law, five-year
undergraduate lecture method of instruction. This law school was
placed at CIDE (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas), a
public university in Mexico City for political science, economics, and
public administration study. It was created out of whole-cloth, to begin
anew, with an interdisciplinary, problem-based, and experiential
pedagogy. 139 Its "small" ambition has been to revamp Mexican legal
education and the Mexican legal system, and to perhaps have an
influence on legal education in the rest of South America. (I would be
thrilled to see a little influence en El Norte myselft)
CIDE's goals are to create a legal education that is
interdisciplinary (including courses in economics, history, and social
science methods); practical (all learning is problem-based and
students are expected to actively participate in each class); diverse
(students are drawn from traditionally underrepresented states, like
Oaxaca, as well as from Mexico City and Monterrey); international
(students are not only studying international law subjects, but are
using common law methods of case reading in a civil law code system);
and innovative (all course texts were written especially for the school
by full-time professors and leading lawyers and judges in each area).
All of these new texts include problem sets for each class, and
readings that include cases, statutes, newspaper articles, law review
articles, social science studies, and other materials. All of the teaching
at CIDE involves active problem solving and presentation by students.
Courses are devoted to simultaneous study of theory, practical
problem solving, policy analysis, skills development, and doctrinal
study. Classes are small enough for personal attention (the first few
classes ranged from thirty to no more than forty-five students for each
139. See Diego Galer, The CIDE Experiment in Legal Education, J. LEGAL EDUC.
(forthcoming); http://www.cide.edu/presentation.htm (providing a fuller description of the CIDE
program); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Evaluation of Problem-Based Legal Education at CIDE (Jan.
6, 2004) (Hewlett Foundation, on file with author).
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year). All students also learn a second language (English, or another
language if English is already known) and engage in clinical
experiences in their later years. Many take part in international study
for one semester in another law school.
The CIDE program is five years of undergraduate law study
and its general program involves the following courses:
First-year
* Problems in Modern Jurisprudence (a problem-based
seminar of discussion of modern legal problems, such as
environmental and community confrontations with
developers, taken from real cases and current events);
* Introduction to Political Science
* Economics I and II
" World History I and II
• Writing and Exposition
• Legal Theory I
* Family Law and Personal Rights
" Mexican History I
" Seminar in Rights/Injuries/Torts
Second Year
" Obligations I and II (Contracts)
* Processes and Procedures
* Quantitative Methods Applied to Law
* Mexican History II
* Logic and Analysis of Norms
* Business and Commercial Law
* Constitutional Law
* Law and Economics
* Legal Interpretation and Argument
Third Year
* Constitutional Law II
* Sociology of Law
* Philosophy of Law
• Business and Commercial Law II
• The Law of Amparo (special writs)
• International Law
* Criminal Law
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* Corporate Finance
" Practicum I
* International Business and Negotiations
• One semester of international study in another law
school (optional)
* Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Fifth Year
* Fiscal and Tax Law I and II
* Administrative Law I and II
* International Law II
* Thesis seminar
* Practicum II
* Public Administration Law
* Labor Law
* Practicum III
It is difficult on the printed page to convey the full innovation
of this program, but take for example the course in Quantitative
Methods Applied to Law taught by Professor Marcelo Bergman (an
Argentinean with an American Ph.D. in political science, who has
taught in at least four countries and is a well-published law and social
science scholar). In this course, Professor Bergman teaches second-
year law students (who are for the most part under twenty years old)
regression analysis, basic Bayesian statistics, correlation coefficients,
and other quantitative methods, and has his students read and
critique current studies of legal phenomena (such as studies of public
satisfaction with judicial systems correlated with expenditures on
judicial systems 140). His students then design research programs to
evaluate particular laws or developments in legal institutions and
predict what data might show, depending on the appropriate methods
chosen to study a particular phenomenon. Finally, students are
expected to work as research assistants on some empirical project
being conducted by CIDE faculty (examples include prison condition
documentation, family court reform, and public attitude surveys).
All of CIDE's classes have an experiential component. In a
class I attended on civil procedure, students presented the different
powers of judges at different levels of the system (as authorized by the
formal Mexican Procedural Code, and informed by actual student
observations of judicial officers), rather than listening to lectures by
their professors or passively reading long and tedious code sections.
The faculty at CIDE consists of a mix of full-time academics
who teach, research, write, and engage in empirical projects and law
and institutional reform efforts, and a group of leading lawyers in
140. There is no direct correlation!
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Mexico City serving as Adjunct Professors (who are jointly writing the
new casebooks being created for this school). Professors describe
themselves as "guides" to the students' learning. Teaching is
interactive, intensive, and personalized. It also is exhausting and time
consuming and performed with the incredible dedication of a cohort of
law professors and lawyers who hope (like the early Legal Realists
and New Dealers) that they are remaking the world.
What I observed as an outside evaluator of this program was
nothing short of revolutionary. If I had ever envisioned an ideal
interdisciplinary law school-here it was, being reinvented everyday,
as students and faculty shared and collaborated on new ideas and
evaluated their current practices. CIDE won the 2004 Center for
Public Resources Award for Problem Solving in Legal Education1 41
and hopes to transmit its teaching philosophy and methods to other
collaborating schools in Mexico and South America. Could it be that
CIDE will succeed in creating the first truly interdisciplinary law
school where we have failed for so many decades? Much depends on
how CIDE's first graduates (the first class of which just graduated in
2006) are received in the legal community-both in private practice
(many students had internships in Mexico's most prestigious law
firms) and in the public sphere (many other students aspire to
political and public office or to judgeships)-and whether they will
disperse to all regions of the country or remain disproportionately in
Mexico City.
IV. CONCLUSION: WILL WE EVER TAKE LAW AND SERIOUSLY?
I have outlined the historical efforts to broaden the study of
law to include the various disciplines that inform it and some current
efforts at curricular reform to realize the potential of true
interdisciplinary study. The arguments for studying law in context
have been with us for well over a hundred years, yet legal education
remains remarkably unchanged. As medical schools, business schools,
and public policy schools, among other professional schools, have
reinvented curricula in recent decades, it is a continuing paradox to
understand why legal education has been so conservative, rigid, and
relatively unchanging. We continue to build new buildings with the
same amphitheatre architecture, designed for large classes where
students cannot see each other. We continue to teach primarily
through appellate cases and a steady diet of "legal reasoning." Much
ink has been spilled on why this is so. In returning to the thought
141. CPR: International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, Problem Solving in
Legal Education Award, http://www.cpradr.org.
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experiments with which I began this paper, one might say that law is
a field, because as a field, it has been remarkably and uniformly
impermeable to other fields and developments in higher education.
Yet experiments in legal education continue to be proposed and
curriculum committees at many schools continue to ask how both
major and minor revisions to the curriculum might be affected. After
my own thirty years of participation in at least six different legal
education reform "movements" (clinical education, legal feminism and
pedagogy, socio-legal studies, law and literature, alternative dispute
resolution, and comparative and international or "transnational" law),
I remain both hopeful and skeptical that we might finally create whole
schools or whole programs that take seriously the notion that law is
not autonomous and must be studied in its contexts-before, during
and after the law as doctrine.
The proposed recrafting of the legal education curriculum by
the Vanderbilt University Law School, 142 which spawned this
Symposium, is the latest effort to rethink the entire law school
curriculum. I wish this latest effort well and hope that Vanderbilt will
not be alone in recognizing that we need ideas and methods from
outside of the law to understand its origins, meaning and effects.
142. See generally Edward L. Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do
About It, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2007).
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